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Financial Distress as a Noncooperative Game:

A Proposa1 for Overcoming Obstacles to
Private Workouts
C lair e F inkelstein

[.

I NT RO DUCTI ON

In th e past se ve ral yea rs, ac ad e mi cs have inc reasingl y expressed
1
di ssatisfac tio n w ith C hap te r 11. A mo ng o the r co mplaints, c riti cs po in t out
th at reorgani zati o ns of maj or public compa nies are ex pens ive a nd usually take
a numbe r o f ye ars to co mp le te .] In additi on, fro m the scant empiric al
information available , failure rates appear hi gh. One study shows that 38. 3%
of reo rgani ze d co mp ani es liq uid ate w ithin four years. 3 Ac cordin gly, acade mic
writers have cast abo ut for alternatives to cou rt-s upe rvis ed reorganizations.
4
Sugges tion s include proposals for an all-equity capital structure, marke t-based
solution s like mand atory auctio ns ,5 a nd measure s designed to e ncourage
pri vate wo rkout agree me nts w hi c h avo id the need for judicial supe rvi sio n
a I togeth e r. 6
I. I I U.S.C. ~~ 1101- 1174 (1 988). Sl'c. e.g .. Barry E. Adle r, Bankm p tcy and R isk A llocation, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 439 ( 1992): Douglas G. Baird, Th e Un easy Ca se fo r Corpora te Reorg anizm ions. 15 J.
LEGAL STU D. 127 ( 198 6); Mi chae l Bradl ey & Mic hae l Rosenzweig, Th e Untenab le Case fo r Chapter II ,
10 1 YA LE L.J . 1043 ( 1992) .
2. There is disagreeme nt about the ave rage length of re organ izat ions for large, publi c compani es. On e
study shows they rake lV2 yea rs on ave rage to compl ete . Ly nn M. Lopucki & William C. Whit fo rd, Venue
Cho ice an d Fo rum Shopping in rhe Bankmprcy Reorganizarion of Large, Pu blicly Held Compan ies, I 99 1
Wts . L. REV. 1 I, 3 1-32 n. 68 (ca lcula ted from inform atio n prov ided). Anot her in dicates an average of
almos t fo ur ye ars. Jul ian R. Fran ks & Wa lte r N. To rous, rln Empiricul ln vesrigarion of U. S. Firms in
Reorgani::.arion , 44 J. Fl;o.;. 747, 748 ( 1989) .
3. See Bradl ey & Rose nzwei g. supm no te I, at 1075 (Tab le I I) (s howing 61.7 % of fir ms sti ll in
operati on after four years).
4. See Barry E. Ad ler, rl Political Theory of Ame rican Corporate Bankruptcy, TEX. L. REV.
(fo rthcom ing 1993) (m anu scri pt at 18, on fil e with auth or) (proposing a fi rm structured ent irely thro ugh
iss uan ce of a fo rm ol· prefe rred stock ca lled "chameleo n equity"): Brad ley & Rose nzweig, supra note 1,
at I053 -54 (proposing an equ ity-based "perfec t markets solut ion").
5. See Douglas G. Baird , Revi sit ing Auctions in Chapte r I I (C hi cago Law & Eco nomic s Working
Pape r No. 7 (2 nd Series), 1992); Bruce A. Mark ell , Own ers, A uctions, and A bsolwe Priority in Bankruptcy
Reo rga niza tions, 44 STAN . L. REV . 69 ( 199 1).
6. Howard J. Kashner. Majoritv Clauses and No n-Bankruplcy Corporate Reorganizarions-Con trac tua l
and Starwory Ailem ari,•es, 44 Bus . LAW 123 ( 1988) (p roposi ng modificati on of Trust Indenture Act to
permit majority rule clauses in deb t co nt racts) ; Mark J. Roe, The Voring Prohibition in Bond Workows, 97
YALE L.J . 232 ( 1987) (same): Alan Schwartz, Bankmprcy Workou ts and Debt Con tracts, J.L. & ECON.
(fo rthcomi ng 1993) (arg uin g that li ft in g ban on wa iver of ba nkruptcy wou ld facilitate pri va te work outs).
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Fro m a theoretical pe rspecti ve, private solutio ns are preferabl e to public
o nes . F irst, beca use of the gre at ex pe nse of fo rmal judicial proceedin g s, pri vate
7
neg oti ati o ns shoul d prod uce substanti al sav in gs over li tiga tion . S eco nd,
co nsen sual re so lution of di sputes is more like ly to ma ximi ze prefe re nces th a n
a so lutio n forced on parti es in the co urse of litiga tio n-' Third, public
procedures, suc h as liti gation and a ucti o ns, expl o it publi c funds fo r the sake
o f pri va te dispute re solution. An y be nefits to the ge nera l publi c fro m th e se
e xpe nditures wo ul d be indirec t, a nd presumabl y d irect a nd more sub sta ntia l
be nefits wo uld result fro m alternati ve expen ditures . For these reas o ns, schol a rs
s ho ul d to look for ways of remo vin g the obstac le s to p rivate se ttleme nts befo re
sea rc hin g for alte rnati ve public procedures .
Thi s Note pres ents a contrac tual sc he me to increase the li kelihood of
se ttlin g co nfli cts inc ide nt to fin anc ial d istress ou t of court: th e incorpora ti o n
into de bt c ontracts of a clause suspe nd ing c redit ors ' state- law collect io n ri g hts
fo r a fi xe d period of time. P art II di ag no ses th e imped iments to pri vate
w o rko ut ag re e me nts unde r c urre nt co ntrac tual prov is io ns. It arg ue s th a t th e low
se ttl e me nt rate is caused by a collecti ve acti on proble m whi c h prohibi ts
negotiatio n in a multi- c reditor situati o n. It th e n con siders th e effect of
un certa inty on the abo ve a nal ys is. In pa rti c ular, thi s Part rebuts the possible
obj ecti o n that the unce rtainty of Ch apter ll li tigation provides a better
ex plan atio n for the lo w se ttleme nt rates. Part III sho ws w hy the pa rties must
imple me nt an y co nsensual solution to the coll ecti ve ac tion probl e m in the
origin a l debt co ntracts. In theory, a direc t, intercreditor co ntract drafted ex
a nte-pr io r to the onse t of fin anc ial di stress-could avo id collec ti ve ac ti on
problems . Part III, however, ex plain s w hy transac tio n cos ts b ar suc h an
ag ree me nt, and thus wh y c reditors must make use of th e ir commo n relatio n
w ith th e debtor to control the be hav ior of o ther c red itors. Pa rt IV present s the
pro posed suspe nsion clause solution. It cons ide rs, amo ng other thing s, the
proble m of prefe rential treatme nt of cert ain c reditors pri or to the pu b lic
decl arati o n of fin a ncial di stress . This Note a rg ues th a t appe ndin g a un a nimous
co nse nt conditi o n to the suspe nsion cla use woul d effec tiv ely solve the
prefere nce proble m. Part V expl ains th at th e inclu s ion o f unanimo us conse nt
c lauses in debt co ntrac ts would elimin ate an othe r pote nti al impediment to
private w orkou ts, the " holdout" problem. 9 It al so argu es that sc ho lars often
7. Bankruptcy proceedings are expe nsi ve and auctions may be as well. The re is evide nce sugges tin g
no t on ly that aucti ons arc more expensive th an pr·ivate wo rko uts . but th at they are eve n mo re e xpensive
than re o rgan ization s. See Frank H . Eas terbroo k, Is Corp ora1e Ban krrtprcr Efficient '· 27 J. FIN. ECON. 4 11,
4 15 ( 1990); see also Ad ler, supra note I , at 469 -7 1.
8. Thi s conclusion ass umes that bargainin g is fai r, in other words , that there is no o ve rreac hin g o r
coerc ion. See Alan Schwa rtz, A Th eory of Loan Priorities , 18 .1. LEGA L STUD . 209, 2 10- 11 ( 1989) (argu in g
for repeal of legal co nstraints on con tractin g to es tabli sh alte rnate priori ty schemes based o n co mmi tm ent
to pe rmit co ntractin g part ies to maxi mize preferences).
9. S tr ictl y speak ing the ho ldout problem is another species of co llective ac tion problem. It is referre d
to here as the holdout prob lem in order to di sting ui sh it fro m th e co llecti ve acti on prob lem co nsi de red in
Pa rt IL
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exaggerate the importance of the holdout problem as an adequate ex pla nation
for the lo w success rates of pri vate workouts. This e mphasis o n hol douts leads
them to overl ook the correct ex planation, th e collec ti ve ac ti o n problem.

II.

THE COLLECTIVE ACTION P ROBLEM

Until relatively recently, the prevailing academic w isdom on co rp orate
reo rgani zation justified Chapter 11 on efficiency gro und s: Chapter 11 preve nts
the di smantlin g under state coll ection laws of fir ms whose going-co ncern valu e
exceeds their liquidation value. 10 Without Chapter 11, c reditors would pursue
immed iate sati sfaction of th eir claims aga in st a fmancially distressed debtor.
Thi s would forfe it the excess of the goin g-conce rn value ove r the liquidatio n
valu e, an d the c reditors as a group would rece ive less than they would were
they willing to wait. 11 Federal inte rvention is justifi ed, the argument run s,
because it so lves a co llec ti ve ac tio n problem. 12
T hom as Jackson and Doug las Baird , the o rigin al propone nts o f thi s view
of fede ral reorganiz ation , present what th ey call th e "c red itors' barga in mode l"
of federal ba nkruptcy la w. 13 Chapter 11 , th ey claim, imple me nts the
agree ment the creditors of a common debtor would re ac h if collec tive acti on
problems did not preclude negotiations. J\!Jwu/{l[ing collect ive proceedings,
Jackso n a nd Baird argue, thu s helps to maximi ze th e preferences o f creditors,
si nce the payoff structure otherwise precludes creditors from realizing the
outcome they would regard as most advantageous.
The sc ant available empirical evidenc e supports Jackson and Baird 's
diagnosis o f the problem. Settle ment rates in bankruptc y are di sproportio nately

I 0. T HOMAS H . JACKSON, THE L OGIC AND Li MITS OF B,\NKRUPTCY LAW 17 ( 1986). For an
examp le of a recent , oppo sing view, see Eli zabeth Warren, Ba nkrup!cy Po/icv, 54 U. CH I. L. REV . 775
( 1987) . See also Theodore Eise nberg, Commenta ry on "On the N(l{ure of Bankmptcy": Bankruptcy and
Bargainin g. 75 VA. L. REV. 205 ( 1989).
II . "Common pool problem s," as this type of collec ti ve ac ti on problem is ca lled, ca n arise in any
si tuation in wh ich multip le claim s are asse rted against an undi vid ed pool of asse ts. Extens i ve disc ussions
on th e su bj ec t appear in th e literalu rc on natural resou rce s suc h as natural gas, oil , minerals , and ocean
resources . See. e.g .. A lan E. Friedman, Th e Economics of !he Common Pool: Property Rigllls in Exha11slible
Reso11rces, 18 UCLA L. REV . 85 5 ( 1971 ); Gary D. L ibecap & Steven N. Wi gg ins, Comra u ual Respon ses
/o !h e Common Pool: Proraling of Cmde Oil ProduCiion , 74 A:VI. ECON. REV. 87 ( 1984); Richard J.
Sweeney et al., lvfarkel Failu re, The Common-Pool Problem. Oil(/ Ocean l?esou rce Exploiu11ion , 17 J. L AW
& ECON. 179 (1974).
12. JACKSON, supra note I 0, at I 0.
13. Se e, e.g ., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOM AS H. JACKSON, CA SES, PROBLEMS AND MATER IALS ON
B AN KRUPTCY (2d ed. 1990): JACKSON, supra note I 0; Baird, supra note I , at 127-28; Douglas G. Baird
& Th omas Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations an d !he Trea /menc of Diverse Ownership Im erests: A
Comment on Adeqtwle Protecuon of Secu red Creditors in Bankru p!cy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 ( 1984);
Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Pi cker, A Simple No ncooperative Bargaining M odel of Cotporate
Reorga nizcllions, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 ( 199 1): Tho mas H. Jackson , Bankruptcy, Non-Bankrup1cy
Entitlenzenls, and 1he Creditors' Barga in, 91 YALE L.J. 857 ( 1982) [hereinafter Jackso n, Creditors·
Bargain]; Th omas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On 1he Nmure of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and 1he Credi10rs' Bargain. 75 VA. L. REv. !55 (1989).

2208

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 102: 2205

low as compared with other areas of the law. 14 Studies indicate that workout
offers from inso lvent firms succeed in fewer than half the cases , 15 whereas
16
settlement rates in other kinds of private suits exceed 90 % . Private suits in
other domains , however, do not appear to diffe r in re levant ways from
litigation in Chapter 11. Reorganization s of large, public c ompanies may be
exceedingly complex, but settlement rates in contexts other than financial
di stre ss are high even for complex disputes involving major corporate
players. 17 Moreover, once the relevant parties actually ente r negotiations, the
prospects of reaching agreement are high. Bankruptcy litigation under Chapter
11 almost alway s res ults in th e confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 18 In
addition, the vast bu lk of successful reorganizations occurs con sensually.
"C ramdowns" 19 are quite rare 20
Taken in combination, the above data suggest that there are no significant
impediments to agreement. Therefore , settlement rates in the financial distress
14. This No te defi nes a "settlem ent'' as any case whose fi nal reso lution took place out of court. This
would in clude cases in which the parti es entered liti gati on initi all y but were able to reach agree ment
privately at a later stage.
15. See Robert Gertn er & David Sh arfstein , A Th eory of Workouts and the Effec ts of Reo rganization
La w, 46 J. FI N. 11 89, 1191 (1 991 ) (sho win g ini tial settlement rates of 73 out of 156 fo r junk bond issues
bet ween 1977 and 1990); Stuart C. Gi ]so n, Bankmptcv, Boards. Banks an d Blo ckh olders: Eviden ce an
Ch ange s in Carporute Ownership and Control \Vhen Firms D ejalllt, 27 j. Fi N. ECON . 355, 356 ( 1990)
(showing private debt restructuring of 50 out of Ill publicly traded companies that experien ced fin ancial
di stress between 1979 and 1985 ); Stuart C. Gils on et al. , Troubled Debt Restru cwrings: An Em p irical Study
of Pri vate Reorganizmion of Fi rms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 326 ( 1990) (sho win g private
restructurings fo r 80 public compani es out of s ~mple of 169 that experienced financial distress between
1978 and 1987).
16. Mi chael D. Green, Sy mposium . The lnabiliry af Offensive Colla te ral Es toppel to Ful fi ll i1s
Promise: An Examination of Es iOppel in Asbes tos Litigation , 70 IOWA L. R EV. 14 1, 180 ( 1984); see
ANNUA L REPORT OF THE DI RECTOR. AD,vJINI STR ATIV E OFFICE OF TH E U:'o! ITED STATES COURTS, 1989
REPORT OF THE PR OCEEDI NGS OF TH E JUDI CIAl . CONFERENC E OF TH E UNITED STATES 21 (over a twel vemonth period in 1988-89 , onl y 5% of civil cases in federal court we nt to trial ). But see Jan et C. Alexander,
Do the M erits Matter ? A S1udy of Settlements in Securi ties Class A ctions, 43 STA N. L. REV . 497, 525
( 1991 ) (es timating the rate of civil suit se ttl emen t as betwee n 60% and 70%).
17. See Al exander, supra note 16, at 525 (se ttl ement rates fo r securiti es class actio ns hi gher th an for
civil litigation generally, roughly 95%) : Green, supra note 16, at ISO (settleme nt 1·ate of approximatel y 95%
for major asbes tos cases); Ri chard L. Schmal bec k & Gary Mye rs, A Policy Analysis of Fee -Shifting Rules
Unde r the In te rna l Revenue Code . I 986 DUKE L.J. 970, 979 (set tl ement rates in appell ate level tax di sputes
sa rne for large cases as for small ). Even the massive legal di spute betwee n Te xaco and Penn zoil over the
acqui siti on of Getty Oil ended in se ttlem ent (albeit aft er ex tensive lit igation in a number of different
courts) . See Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wil so n, Ration al Ba rgaining an d M arket Efficiency:
Underswnding Penn zoil v. Texaco , 75 V A. L. REV. 295. 296 ( 1989) .
18. See Lopucki & Whitford , Sitp ra note 2, 18, at 41 n. l 05 (fi nding confirmati o n rates of 89% to 96%
for largest Chapter II 's fil ed betwee n 1979 and 1988); see also Gilso n et al., supra note 15, at 31 6, 32 1
(s howin g a co nversion rate from Chapter I I to Chapter 7 of 5% for samp le of pu blicl y traded companies
th at filed for bankruptc y between 1978 ::mel 1987 ).
19. The debtor's power, under II U.S. C. § 1129( b) ( 1988), to im pose a plan over th e objecti on of
credito rs if he can sho w the pl an co nfo rm s to the absolute priority rul e is known as the "cramclo wn" power.
20. See Gilson et al., supra note 15, at 31 8; Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Preemplive
Cram Do wn , 65 AM. BAN KR. L.J . 625, 627,629 (1 99 1) (study of reorganization s of 43 large, publicl y he ld
compani es showed plan proponents so ught cramd ow n in onl y three cases). As we shall see, however, the
holdout problem may impair the prospects fo r reachin g agreement even when the re levant parti es are able
to negoti ate in the private context. Because Chapter II gives debtor and maj ority creditors the power to
bind dissenters, the holdout problem does nor stand in the way of agreement in Chapter II in the same way
th at it does outside it.
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context could equal those in other types of di sputes. A plausible explanation
for the low se ttlement rates is that a collective action proble m impedes
otherwise feasible agreements. Proponents of the creditors' bargain model thus
correctly assert that Chapter 11 allows th e parties to achieve a solution
comparable to one they would reach through negotiati ons were it possible to
eliminate collective action problems.
The collective action problem is a species of n-person prisoner's dilemma
("P-D"). The proble m is that each creditor' s pursuit of a rational strategy
maximizing her welfare in the short run produces an outcome which is
suboptimal for all. Another possible outcome, the cooperative solution,
improves the collective welfare, even from an individual max imizing
perspective. By following individual maximizing strategies, however, the
parties foreclose this solution.
To take a simple, two-party example, suppos e a debtor has only two
creditors, both unsecured. Each creditor has a claim against the debtor for
$ 100. Suppose al so that the debtor has only one asset, a machine worth exactly
$100 if sold. The liquidation value of the debtor 's business is thus $100. But
adding the debtor's expertise makes the business worth $!50 as a going
concern. Each creditor faces a choice: either seek immediate satisfaction of her
claim, or wait and hope to capture the going-concern value. Suppose Creditor,
decides to demand immediate repayment. If Creditor2 decides to wait, Creditor,
will recover her claim in full. But Creditor2 may also decide to seek immediate
recovery. Since, ex ante, each creditor has a 50% chance of getting to the
debtor first, the value of the claim diminishes in accordance with the
probability of its satisfaction in full. The claims ex ant e are thus worth $50 to
21
each creditor if both pursue collection immediately. Alternatively, Creditor,
could decide to wait. If, however, Creditor 2 decides to seek payment, Creditor,
will lose completely. If both decide to wait, each will eventually recover
$7 5. 22 Each party's dominant strategy is to seek payment, but exercising these
strategies simultaneously is inefficient. Unfortunately, however, only this
solution is a Nash 23 equilibrium.

2 1. Ex post, of course. thi s is no longer th e case. Either Creditor, o r Creditor 2 will get to the debtor
tirst, and o ne will receive $ 100 while the other receives nothing. But from the ex ante pers pective, the
claim can be thought of as worth $50 in the case in whi ch both pursue simultaneously.
22. The cha rt below indicates the payoffs. (The left-hand nu mbe r is Cred itor, 's payoff. the right-hand
Cred itor2 's.)
CREDITOR,

-

Seek Payment

Wait

Seek Payment

$50, $50

$100, $0

Wait

$0, $ 100

$75, $75

CREDITOR,

23. Nash equilibrium is a game th eoretic concept used to describe a strategy combination in which no
player has incentive to deviate from hi s strategy give n tha t the ot her players do not dev iate. See ERIC
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This case, however, di ffers fr om the usual P-D situation in one important
respec t. In the usual P-D , the parties cannot make binding ag reeme nts.
T herefore , even if they agree in adva nce to cooperate, they ca nn o t trust one
another not to de fe ct. In th e present sit uation , the proble m is not that an
ag ree me nt would not be binding . On th e contrary, an intercreditor agreement
would be enforceable as is any ot her legally bi nding c o ntract. "~ The problem
li es instead in the fact that th e parties cannot ne gotiate with o ne another at any
point before or durin g th e ga me.
The impos itio n o f the automatic stay 25 in reo rga ni zati o n proceeding s
facilitates cooperation by e liminating the payoffs from non coopera ti ve
be havior. Proponents of the creditors ' bargain m odel are right thu s far. B ut thi s
resu lt does not constitute an adequate justification for Chapter 11. ~ 6 For th e
fo llow in g reaso ns, Chap te r 11 is a suboptimal soluti on to the collec ti ve action
problem. First, th e return to the parti es if they liti gate is lower than it wo ul d
be if they cou ld cooperate without court s upe rvi s ion. Private settlement creates
a cos t sa vings whic h the parties cou ld divide pro rata. Second , to the ex tent
that Cha pter 11 is the onl y w ay to pre ve nt a run on ass ets , debtors are fo rced
to take refuge in C hapter II eve n when they have no other re as o n fo r us in g
a co urt- superv ised procedure . The collective action proble m a nd the lack of
available alternatives to a Chapter 11 fi lin g thus e ncourage use of federal
bankruptcy law that would othe rwise be unn ecessary. A solution to th e
collec ti ve ac tion problem that severed collecti ve ac ti on from di stributi o nal
q uestions wo ul d enable debtors to choose to enter C hapter 11 o nl y when they
required th e full ra nge of court powe rs to facilitate acceptance o f a plan.

RASMUSEN, G AMES .'< ND INFORMATION : AN INTR ODUCTION TO GAME TH EORY J J ( 1989) .
24. The fi nancia l di stress game may occ upy an intermediate statu s be tween fu ll y cooperative and fully
noncooperative games. See JOHN C. H i\RSANYI, RATIONAL BEH AV IOR AND B ARGA INING EQUII.IBRIUM IN
GAMES AND SOC IAL SITUATI Oi\S 110- 11 ( 1977) (discussing on e su ch interm ediate catcgo 1·y called th e
alm osr-noncoope rative game).
25 . II U.S.C. ~ 362 ( 1988 & Supp. II 1990).
26 . A nalogous argu me nts fo r mandatory schemes have greater force in an extralegal co ntext. Some
comme ntato 1·s, fo r ex am ple, interpret H obbes ' ju stification for th e existen ce of gov emm ent as a so lution
to a P-0 probl em. See JEAN H AMPTON, H OB BES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TR ADITI ON ( 1986). Sh e
argu es that th e inhabitant s of the state of natme-descrihcd by H obbes as a state of " Warrc . w here every
man i s Enemy to eve ry man." an d in whic h " me n l i ve wi th out other sec urity, th an what th eir own strength ,
and their ow n inve nti on shall fu rn ish them w ithall ." T IIOMAS H OBBES, LEVIATII AN 186 (C. B. Macpherson
ed., 1968) ( 165 1)-arc in a nonc ooperative gam e that has th e structure of a P-D. A lthough all w ould be nelit
from coo perati on, they cann ot cooperate because no agreement can be bindin g. As H obbes says . "'the
que stion is not of promi ses mu tual I, wh ere th ere is no sec uri ty of perform ance on either sid e: as w hen the re
is no Civi ll Power erec ted ove r the parties promising;Jor such promises are no Covenants . .. .··/d. at 204
(e mphasis added). The coe rci ve power o f a strong, ce ntral authority is justi!l ed as the onl y way to ex it from
the P-D.
Thi s game theoreti c j ustifi cati on fo r ci vil governm ent depend s on the assumption that the parti es
cann ot make binding agreem ents. In th e ban kruptcy co ntex t, by contras t, becau se th ere i s a legal sy stem
in effect , the parti es could make bindin g co ntracts if onl y th ey cou ld negotiate. See sup ra text
accompanyin g note 24. If the creditors are in a sem icooperati ve game, the justifi ca ti on for mandatory
soluti ons may not appl y.
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Anothe r possible e xplanation for the low settlement rates , however, might
be advanced. Parties vvill go to court only if the outcome of litigation is
uncertain: it must eithe r be the case that the ir expectations about the resu lts of
trial confli ct, or that o ne or both parties lack clear ex pectation s about the
re sult. 27 One mi ght. then, explain the low settlement rates by saying that
Chapter l J litigation is substantially more uncertain than other types of
liti gati on. Higher leve ls of certainty in other areas of the law produce higher
settleme nt rates . Se ttl e me nt rate s in the financial distress context may be low
simply because the parti es bargain in the shadow of bankruptc y law. Without
firm expectations abou t their bankruptc y shares, the parties have may have
insuffi c ie nt informati o n to negot iate.
A deta iled conside rat ion of the effec ts of uncertainty is beyond the scope
of this Note. It will suffic e to show that the above argume nt suffe rs from tw o
flaws. First, it is not clea r that the outco me of Chapter II litigation is more
uncertain than outcomes in other types of litigation . Indeed , creditors may ha ve
greater certainty about th e outcome of litigation in bankruptcy than liti gants do
in o ther contexts , s ince the pa rti es know that the co urt will apply the absolute
priority rule in bankruptcy. and will require th e debtor to disclose all rele vant
financial information. A rebuttal would point out that reorgani zation plans
systematically vi o late absolute priority. Equity regularly receives on the orde r
of 5 % 2 ~ in C hapter ll. But because the return to equity is reliable and
sys temati c, v iolations of absolute priorit y may not, in the long run , increase th e
parties' level of unce rtainty.
Second , while it is true that certainty leads to se ttlement, the converse does
not follow. Uncertainty may or may not lead to litigatio n. Even unde r
uncertainty, the parti es may prefer to settle in order to capture the sa vings from
the avoided litigation costs. This is especially so if the parties' expectations ,
although uncertain, happe n to coincide. Some authors hav e indeed argued that
uncertainty fuel s se ttl e ment. 2 ~ Although the e ffects of uncertainty o n
settlement rates remain s an open question, uncertainty appears to be a
necessa ry but not a suffi c ient condition for liti gati on.

27. Sa. e.g., George L. Priest & Benjam in Klei n, Th e Selecrion of Displllesfor Litigarion , 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 17 ( 1984) (" In liti gati on . as in gambling, agree ment ove r the outco me leads parties to drop out. '") ;
Steve n Shave ll, Suit, Se11/ement. and Trial: A The ore rica/ Analysis Unde r Altemative ivfethods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, I I 1. U·:GAL STUD . 55, 63 ( 1982) ("[T]he onl y fact or th at cou ld lead to a tri al
is that the plaintiff's expectation s as to th e likelihood of success or the judgme nt that could be obtain ed
are more optimistic tha n the defendant's" ).
28. Studies show th at reo rg an ization plans routin ely vi ol ate abso lute pt·iority. See Lynn M. Lo pucki
& William C. Whitford. Bargaining Over Equity~· Share in the Bankruptcv Reorganization of Lw:~e.
Publicly H eld Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 142 ( 1990 ) (Table IIJ ); see als o Schwartz, sup ra note
6, at 10- 11. This ca n probab ly be explained by the fact that it is difficult for manage me nt to remai n in
possessio n without the acq ui esce nce of th e shareholders.
29. See Peter H. Sc huck, Th e Role ofl11dges in Sellling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example,
53 U. CHI. L. RE V. 337. 346 n.JO (noting '" a strong positi ve relationship be twee n uncertaint y of outcome
and settl emen t") ; see u/so Eisen be rg , supra note I0, ;.tt 210.
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F inally, while uncertainty impairs the parties' ability to reach agreement,
it need not have this same effect o n the ir ability to nego tiate. If unce rta inty
caused lo w settlement rates, one wou ld ex pect to see many priv ate workouts
attempted and high rates of failed ne gotiation s. The limited evidence there is,
however, indi cates the contrary. Corporation s in serious distress te nd to ente r
Chapter 11 immedi ately upon reaching the cri tic al level of insolvency. In most
cases. th ey do not even atte mpt a private workout before they resort to
liti gati o n 30 Tf uncertainty affects the prospec ts of se ttl emen t, it is more likely
w hen the parties can negoti ate and yet cannot agree. A lthough there is virtually
no e mpiri cal e vidence on the question, such cases probably compri se only a
small frac ti on of thos e that end up in Ch apter 11. 3 1
Before turning to the proposed suspen sio n clause so luti o n, this Note w ill
con sider whether the debtor's assets cou ld be di stributed prior to th e o nse t of
financial di stress by a direct, intercreditor ag ree ment.

III. EX

ANTE l NTERCREDITOR AGREEMENTS

The parties could cooperate if th ey could agree in advance to play th e ir
no ndominant strategies . Part II argued th at a coll ec ti ve action problem
precludes th e creditors from committing themse lves to this re sult consensually,
beca use it impedes the parties from nego tiating with one another. This
impediment to negotiation , however, emerges only after the o nset of financial
di stres s. If creditors could sit down at the bargaining table before they learned
of their common debtor' s financial di stress-in o ther wo rd s, before they k new
their relative priorities-they co uld pres umably se ttle on a course of action fo r
resolving common financial proble ms.32 Because an ex ante agree me nt of thi s
sort would result from bargaining behind a "ve il of ig noranc e," 33 the creditors

30. See Lynn M. Lop ucki, The Debtor in Full Cmllrol: Systems Failure Under Chapter JI of the
Bankmptcv Code.?, 57 AM BAN KR. L.J. 99, 116 (1983) (cha racte rizing as exaggerated view that
negot iati o ns are commonl y attempted and presenting stu dy of 48 ban krupt compan ies showi ng that no ne
had attem pted worko ut s) . See also J. Bradl ey John ston, The !Junkruptcy !Jargain: National Confe ren ce of
!Jankruptcy Judges, 65 AM . BANKR. L.J . 2 13, 232 n. 97 ( 1991) (Pointing out that workouts arc generally
not attempted by firm s that later file fo r ba nkru ptcy, despite co mmonly held view that workouts are
common ).
3 i. The Lopuck i study appears to be the onl y ev ide nce thJt bears on the que stion , see sup ra note 30,
at 116, an d the sample of fi rm s examin ed in that stud y is not suffic ientl y !Jrge to allow reliabl e infere nces
about the overall nu mber of attempted workouts to be clrJwn. The hypothesis th at fe w firm s that enter
Chap ter II hav e actuall y attempted workouts is not, however. an unreasonable working hypothesi s.
32. Tho mas Jackso n and Robert Scott present a ju stifi ca ti on of bankruptcy along these lines. They
modify the ori ginal creditors' bargain model by argui ng that J n ex <:nte ba rga in amo ng credito rs wo uld be
motivated by a desi re to provide fo r risk-sharin g in the even t of a com mo n disaster. Jackso n & Scott, supra
note 13; but see Mark J. Roe, Comm entary on "On the Na ture of Bankruptcy": !Jankmptcy, Prio rirv, and
Economics, 75 VA . L. REV . 2 19, 221 ( 1989) (argui ng th at creditors may not want to share ri sks e~ ante
because "the costs of asce rtai nin g the full ran ge and probability of po tenti al ou tcomes is too hi gh. ")
33 . JOH N RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1971 ). For an attem pt to appl y Rawlsian ana lys is to the
bankrupt cy situati on, see Donal d R. Korobkin, Con/rae/arianism and the Nonnative Fottndations of
Bcmkruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 ( 1993).
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would not know enough abo ut the ir respec ti ve pos itio ns relati ve to the debtor
to adopt indi vidual maximizing strategies. Collec tive act io n problems wou ld
not arise. Moreover, if the parties are generall y ri sk-a verse, the ir ratio nal
strategy would be to maximize the common welfare. They wo uld agree to
share losses fairly- equ all y if they have no information about the ir future
re lation s to th e de btor, or pro rata if they have some knovvledge abou t the size
of the ir re spective loan s and anticipated priorities.-' 4
All potential creditors wo uld have to contract to cover all contin ge nc ies
created by th eir varying interests if ri sks are to be di stributed in advan ce
thro ugh an ex ante agreement. A t this stage, howeve r, it is imposs ible to know
wh ich individuals must be party to such an agreemen t. In Arms of any
sub stantial s ize , the ide ntity of creditors and th e amount of debt is li ke ly to
fluctu ate constantly, and, es pecially where trade c red it is concerned , the
ide ntity of c reditors may not always be known. Debt contracts may be oral,
and th e debtor may not have a precise record of the status of its debt at any
g iven moment in time. Thus, neither the identity o f the creditors, nor the
amount of insolvency, can be determined prior to the onset of financial
di stre ss .
\Vhile a co ll ective act ion problem bars agreement ex post, transaction costs
of a ce rtain kind bar agreements ex ante. 35 Not surpri singl y, proponents of the
cred itors' bargain model use the existence of tran saction costs, along with the
co ll ective acti on problem, to justify Chapter 11 . They argue that courts upe rvised reo rganizati on impleme nts the agreement the parti es to a C hapte r
11 proceed ing would have reac hed if tran sac tion cos ts did not preclude private
agreement. 36
34. See Alan Schwartz, Con traCiin gfor Priority Pos itions (u npublished manusuipt, at 4) (on t1 1e with
author) (a rgui ng that borrowers can expec t to cont ract fo r at leas t two classes of debt) At the early ex an te
stage under co nsideration , however, creditors will not necessa rily know to wh ich class they will be long,
even if they can antici pate that there will be more than one class of debt. T he ide ntity of th e lende r will
nevertheless prov ide an indi cati on.
35. It may see m mi sleading to sugges t that the task of identifying the re levan t p:m ics ex ante is
pro hi bited merely by the expense of searching fo r them. The concept of transaction costs, however, is
some tim es given a broad interpretation; it applies to virtually any feature of a situation th at makes it more
difficu lt to conduct consensual transactions. See Guido Calabres i & Dou glas Mel:!med, Propern· Rules,
Liabilit\' Rules. and fn alienabiliry: One View of the Cathedral, 85 H ARV. L. RE V. I 089 . I 094-95 ( 1972) .
36. Thomas Jackson appears to be concerned with transaction costs, alt hough he does not usc the term
explicitl y:
Although we would expect to see a mandato ry co llec tive proceeding as a stand ard feat ure of
the creditors' bargain, no ex an te meeting of the credito rs wil l, rea li stical ly, take place. A
debtor's pool of credito rs changes ove r time and eve n the debtor is un li kely to know who the
creditors of the business will be at any point in the future. As a resu lt, the cred itors them se lves
cannot be expected to negoti ate this agreement, even though it would be in the ir joint intere st
to do so. A fe deral bankru ptcy rule solves thi s problem by making ava ilab le a mandatory
collective sy stem after insolvency has occu rred .
Jackso n. Creditors' Bargain, S11pra note I3, at 866-67 (c itati ons omitted). Jackso n concl ud es that because
credi to rs cannot con tract ex ante on their own, a mandatory sharing ru le, such as th at provided by Chapter
I I, is justified, since it effec tuates the solution the parties would ha ve reached had agreeme nt been possible.
As discussed above, however, the ineffi cacy of consensua l solut ions can not prov ide a j ustification fo r a
mand atory scheme unles s it can be show n that no altern ati ve means of overcoming the im pedi ments to
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An analogous argument justifies protecting interests in person and property
with a liability rule in the context of automobile accidents. 37 A liability rul e
permits individuals to impose risks as long as they "buy" the privilege ex post.
The argument holds thi s is de si rable, becau se parties to an accident are barred
by high tra nsacti o n costs from distributing the losses from an accident by
contract in advance. 33 No wealth has been tran sferred before the accide nt. Ex
ante, the potential victim still has something to "sell" to the potential injurer,
name ly his willingness to be exposed to danger at some time in the future.
Thus the pa11ies can bargain ex ante. Ex post, however, no bargain can take
place, since the loss has fallen entire ly on the victim, and the injurer has no
incenti ve to agree to share that loss . Thus, bargaining must take pl ace ex ante,
but becau se transaction costs prohibit ex ante bargaining , a mandatory
distributional rule is indi spe nsab le.
Although in the acci dent case transaction costs preclude negotiation at the
only conce ivabl e bargaining point, namely ex ante, financial distress is
different. The debtor 's declaration of financial distress identifies the relevant
parties . Unlike in the accident s ituation, the creditors still have an incentive to
bargain ex post. There are two reasons for thi s. First, immediately after the
announcement of financial distress, the gains and losses have not yet been
distributed. The even t that sepa rates ex ante from ex post is not a wealthtran sferring eve nt, as it is in the accident case . Second, the parties have an
incentive to bargain over the divi s ion of the bankruptcy cost savings. Thus,
eve n if finan c ial di stress inexorably implied a certain fixed pattern of
distribution in bankruptcy, parties attempting to settle out of court would have
something over which to barga in. Theoretically, bargaining in the financial
distress situation can take place at a time when the identities of those affected
are already fixed, that is, at a time when trans acti on costs would not prohibit
negotiation. Although the parties have incentive to bargain, however, they are
precluded at thi s point from bargaining by collecti ve action problems. If the
collective action problems could be solved by suspending alternative method s
of debt collection , the parties could bargain with one ar;other ex post.

agreement ex ist. See supra note 26 and acco mpa nying te xt.
37. See GUIDO C.ALAB RESI, THE COST o r: ACCID ENTS 90-92 ( 1970); Calabrcsi & Melamed. supra note
34. at 1108-09. The theory is that, in the abse nce of tran sacti on costs. drivers would enter into ex ante
agreements wi th one an other in order to all ocate the risk of ac cidents in advance. Some drivers who va lu ed
driv in g dan gerously wo uld purchase the right to do so from those they endangered. In order to ensure that
the costs of every poss ible accide nt were allocated in advance, every driver would have to contract with
eve ry other dri ve r (not to mentio n pedes trians) with whom he might come into contact. Moreover, ex ante
con tracts woul d ha ve to specify eve ry possible type of injury at th e various possible level s of se verity, in
add iti o n to the types of propert y damage, etc. Transaction costs clearly would be prohibitive, since both
the number of dangerous dri vers and the vari ety of ri sks to which they ex pose others is cno r·rn ous.
Alternatively, the parties could sign a single. vast contract, but in thi s case th e ag ree ment would have to
spec ify eve ry possible type of interaction, establi sh a price for each one, and make provisions presc ribin g
the mode of wea lth -transfer with respect to all such interacti ons.
38. Calabresi & Me larned, supra note 34, at II 08-09.
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T EMPORARY SUSPENSION CLA USES

The collective action proble m di sappe ars if creditors' state-law collection
rights are unavailable when the de btor announces that he is in finan cial
distress. The parties should therefo re incorporate a temporary waiver of
c reditors' collection rights und e r state law into the original debt instrument.
The contract should spec ify a fixed suspen s ion period of relatively short
duration , pe rhap s one month . The theory be hind the suspe nsion clause solution
is that it enables the parties to nego ti ate as well as provides maximal ince ntive
for coope ration by re taining the threa t advantage the c reditors and the debtor
ha ve over one another. It accomplishes this by re turnin g these rights at the e nd
of the suspe nsion period: th e creditors are re stored the ir right to collect under
state law and the de btor is res to red hi s right to fil e for bankruptc y.
Coordination is faciliated because all parties know that the other parties can
resort to their legal rights if the nego tiations do not succeed. C reditors know
that they will have to compete with oth e r creditors for the debtor's assets on
a first-come-first-served basis if th ey cannot reach agreement. The creditors as
a group know that the debtor may f1l e for bankruptc y if he is not permitted to
retain a certain amount of the value of the firm for equity. And although the
creditors' right to pursue collection under state law does not amount to much
if debtor retains hi s power to enter Chapter 11, debtor may wish to avoid
bankruptcy himself, and since the only answer he has to a rush on his as sets
is to file for Chapter 11 , he has reaso n to fear the creditors' invocation of their
state-law rights. The suspension clause solution is thu s a way of exploiting the
incentives created by exi sting legal reg imes to help maximi ze th e parties'
chances of avoiding using these reg imes
Insolvency, as defined in the de bt contract, triggers the suspension
provision. At the relevant leve l of in solve ncy, the terms of a contract
containing a suspension clause vvould require the debtor to notify its creditors
of its financial position and to prov ide a reaso nable account of its assets and
liabilities. The debtor should pro pose a workout plan shortly after notification .
The debtor could facilitate coordination by calling a general mee ting of the
creditors to explain th e offer. Because creditors might require more time to
evaluate the debtor 's offer, the parties might wish to include a provi s ion in the
suspe nsion clause allowing th e creditors to vote to extend the negotiation
period, e ither unanimously or upo n a certain number of votes.
Although the suspen sion clause restrains both the debtor and the creditors
from legal action during the suspension period , the parties do not in fact
commit themselves to negotiate by including the clause in the debt instrument.
They merely create a window of time during whic h they can safely explore
extra-legal avenues. Conceivably, neither party will initiate negotiations. The
parties' incentives to settle depends on the ir assessment of the like lihood of
ba nkruptcy and of their probable ret urns in Chapter t l. For e xa mple, if a
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credito r does no t think the de btor likely to enter Chapter 11 at th e end of the
suspensi o n pe riod , she mi g ht prefe r to wait o ut the month and try to coll ect
und er state law. If, ho weve r, she fully ex pects the debtor to enter bankruptcy
at the e nd of th e waiting period , she has incentive to settle. Thu s a de btor ca n
incre ase th e like lihood of successful negoti ati o ns if he c an credibly threate n to
ente r bankruptcy at th e e nd of the suspe nsion period.
A debtor, to o , will weigh the like lih ood of Chapter 11 in considering
whe th e r to atte mpt settlement. A debtor mi g ht be partic ularl y inte rested in
settling if he thinks he stand s a reaso nable chance o f recovery. In that case, he
might wo rry he would have to pay off the creditors' claim s in f ull if he fails
to settle. The deb tor's optimal bargaining position is one in which he knows
he has a reaso nable chance of s uccess but is able to convince creditors to the
contrary. In order to avoid coercion of this sort, the parti es should include
significant disclosure requirements in the ir debt contracts to operate in
conjunction with th e suspe ns ion clause.
One objection to thi s sc heme might be that the partie s will not want to
include the suspension clause in their debt contracts, even if they would wa nt
to settle once the sus pe nsion of state-law ri g hts had removed the impe dim e nts
to consensual solutions . But the suspensio n clause should be attractive to
anyone who had strong rea sons to avoid litigation . The debtor and the various
classes of creditors all share such reaso ns .
Secured creditors will appreciate the advantage s of a high-press ured
negotiation, since they suffer mo st from the le ngth of bankruptcy proceedings
under the present system. Despite the requirement under the Bankruptcy C ode
that secured creditors rece ive "adequate protection," 39 the Supreme Co urt has
held that sec ured creditors are not entitled to compensation for the time value
of th e ir claims while bankruptcy proceedings are under way ..J 0 Banks and
other lenders who lend on a secured bas is are in effect require d to make
inte rest-free loans to debtors who enter Chapter 11. Normally, the return to
secured creditors is not in doubt, since secured creditors c an us uall y rece ive
full value. Consequently, sec ured creditors are above all concerned with the
spee d of the proceedings . Although they will not rece ive a larger no minal sum
in the workout than they would receive in bankruptcy, their interes t in e arly
payment will make them more than willing to facilitate negotiation s. Moreover,
because loss of inte rest over a several-ye ar pe riod can be sig nific a nt, sec ured
creditors might even be willing, at the negoti at ion stage, to give up so me value
in order to facilitate a workout. The exces s could be used to c oax recalci tra nt
general creditors into acceptin g the debtor 's offer.

39. II U.S. C. ~ 362(d)(l) ( 1988) . Acceptable methods for prov idin g "adeq uate pro tection" are uefined
in II U.S.C. § 36 1 (1988), but neither that sect ion nor§ 362(d)( l ) exp lain what consti tutes " ad eq uate
protection" in the context of sec ured creditors.
40. United Sa v. Ass'n v. Timbe rs of Inwood Fo res t Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 ( 1988 ).
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Although the time savings also provides un sec ured c reditors with an
incentive to in corporate the suspe nsion clause into their debt contracts, the cos t
savings advantages un secured creditors most. The un secured creditors usuall y
benefit direc tly from an increase in the poo l of asse ts. In addition, since no
single un secured creditor can forc e the debtor into a n in voluntary
reorgani zation , an uns ecured creditor may worry that the de btor w ill not e nter
Chapter 11 and will be di sman tled unde r state "grab" laws instead. Unsec ured
c reditors will we lc o me the o ppo rtunity to reduce the likelihood of both these
unfavorabl e outcomes.
Finall y, the debtor al so has adequate ince ntive to avoid having to choose
betwee n a possibl e di sman tling under state law or a long, drawn-out
reorga ni zation . Despite the ri se in the numbe r of reorgani zation s in the last
thirty years, 41 sig nific a nt stigma still ac co mpani es bankruptcy. This sti g ma
often tran s lates into loss of goodw ill and other impediments to financi al
rehabilitation. Michael Bradley and Michael Rose nzweig have recently cas t
doubt on th e traditi onal w isdom that ma nagers will attempt to a void
bankruptcy at all cos ts, claiming th at Chapter 11 "serves mainl y to protect
managers' jobs." 42 They claim th at ma nagers who have misma naged a
company and fear replacement w ill throw the company into ban kruptc y in
43
order to re main in co ntro l.
But this claim is not supported by the
evidence. 44 Stuart Gilson, in a study of 409 of th e most troubled public
companies in Chapter 11 between 1979 and 19 84 , showed that man age rs lost
their jobs within two years after fl.ling in 71 % of the cases.45 When taken in
conjunction with studi es showing ex tremely low turnover rates for nonbankrupt
companies , as well as lo wer rates for di stressed , but nonbankrupt co mpanie s,
the Gilso n study demons trates that bankruptcy proceedings impair managerial
sec urity. 46
A seco nd objection might be that an attempt to conduct a private
reo rgani zation would e ncounter a prefere nc e problem. While the trustee in
41 . The total number of co r-porate ban kruptcy fi lin gs rose from 12,284 in 1960 to 62,534 in 1989.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DI RECTOR, ADMINISTRATI VE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS I 63 ( 1960) an d
ANNUA L REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADivii NISTRATIVE 0 f'F ICE OF THE U .S . COURTS 362 ( I 989).
42 . Michael Bradley & Michael Rosen zw eig, Time ro Scratle Chapter I I, N.Y. TIM ES , Mar. 8, 1992,
at F 13 .
43. See Bradl ey & Rose nzwe ig, mpra note I, at I 050-5 I. They al so claim th at managers will be mo re
incl ined to make risky inves tm ent decis io ns because they kn ow that Chapte r II is ava il abl e in the event
of fa il ure. !d.
44. See Elizabeth Warren, Th e Unrenuble Case for Repeal ofChaprer If, 102 YALE L.J. 437,448-55
( 1992).
45 . Stuart C. Gi Iso n. Managemenr 7/u·no ve r and Financial Disr ress, 25 J. FIN . ECO N. 241, 24 7 (I 989).
Gilson al so shows th at managers of financially di stressed companies who avo ided Chapte r II and
restructured privately instead lost their jobs at a rate of 60% within two years of restructuring. !d.
46. See Sheila M. Puffer & Joseph B. Weintrop, Corporare Performan ce and CEO Turnover: Th e Role
of Performance Expecrarions, 36 AD"v1 1N. SCI. Q. I, 6- 7 ( 1991) (reportin g mean annuali ze d turnover rate
of 5.3 % for CEO 's of 480 large publicly traded companies); Michael Weisbach, Owside Dire crors and
CEO 1/m wver, 20 J. FiN. ECON . 43 1. 438 -4 I ( 1988) (re port in g mean an nu alized turno ver rate of 3-5% fo r
367 nondi stressed firms betwee n 1974 and I 983).
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C hapter 11 has th e power to a void tran sfers that have con veye d assets out of
the de btor' s estate nin ety days prior to the date of filing ,47 no one in the
\VOrko ut situation is similarly e mpow ered. A fi rm th at anticipates insolvency
can co nvey all its assets to a preferred creditor, onl y then dec laring itself
in solvent a nd open to negotiati ons. The credit ors are apparently powerless to
fo rc e the return of the assets .
T he re is, howeve r, an implicit bargaining so lution to th e preference
prob le m und e r th e suspen sion c lause reg ime . Beca use the suspension clause
me rely defe rs th e threat of bankruptcy, all parties know that the dispute would
stand a s ignificant c hance of w ind ing up in co urt if the parties fail to settle by
the time the suspe nsio n period run s out. They also know that once thi s
happe ns, ass umin g th e nin ety-day prefe re nce period has not expi red, the
prefe rred creditor' s interes t w ill be avo ided. Other creditors now enjoy
sig nific ant leve ra ge aga in st the preferred c reditor, th at is, as suming it is in their
interes ts to expend the resources to bargain w ith him. If the prefe n·ed creditor
has rec eive d a substa ntial eno ugh portion of the asse ts, it will not be worth the
c reditors ' while to settle with th e debtor w ith out the return of these assets to
the deb tor 's es tate . In that case, the creditors w ill prefer bankruptcy to the
workout offer, and thi s allows the m to threaten c redibl y to block any
settl e me nt offer from the debtor. This leaves the debtor with no alte rnative but
to ti le for bankruptcy at the end of the suspens ion period. If th e debtor is
recalcitrant, the creditors ca n also bring an ac tion under § 303 of th e
Bankr uptcy Code to force the debtor into an in vo lun tary Chapter ll o r C hapter
7 p rocee din g . ~B
The preferred creditor wi I! thu s w ish to acc ept a settleme nt o ffer which
acco rd s her some amount betwee n what she would rece ive in bankruptcy and
the face value of her claim (ass uming she rece ived the latter in the preferred
transfer) . To induce her to give up value , other parties can offer som e
addition a l amount, representing the probability that the debtor might not
:.1ctually e nter bankruptcy in th e e ve nt that th e suspe nsio n period expires
w itho ut se ttlement. She might, then , be able to hold out for sligh tl y more tha n
she would ha ve rece ived had she not already bee n paid. But if the debtor' s or
the cred itors' threat to file for Chapter 11 is credibl e, thi s add itional a mount
w ill be small.
The above solution to the preferen ce proble m depend s on a relati ve ly short
suspen s ion period. What would happe n if the parties wished to pro vide for a
longer s us pe nsion period, for example, a three-instead of a one-month
period ? U nder current law, creditors would run the ri sk th at the debto r would
convey asse ts out of the estate just prior to the suspension period and the n be
4 7. II U.S.C. § 547 (b ) ( 1988).
48 . In o rder to bring a n inv o lunta ry Chapter II o r Cha pter 7 pet iti o n, there mu s t be three o r more
creditors wh ose cla ims are no ncontingent. and, if the re are fewer th a n 12 cred itors, one m m ore of the
cred itors must have claims worth at leas t $5,00 0 in the aggregate. I I U.S.C. § 303(b) ( 1988).
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unable to draw th ese assets back in in an eve ntual Chapter 11 proceeding. In
order to allow the partie s maximum flexibilit y in the time for suspen sion, §
547 of the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to provide that the ninety-day
preference period wou ld be tolled wh ile th e suspension clause was in effect.
The parties would then be free to adopt whatever suspens ion period they
regarded as advantageous, w ithou t running the ri sk of losi ng th e threat
advantage provided by the trustee 's a void ing powers in an eve ntual
ba nkru ptcy. The parties must add a clause forbidding the debtor from
co nveying assets out of th e es tate during the suspens ion pe riod. ho wever, if the
Bankruptc y Code were amended in thi s way.
A third, an d perhaps more seriou s, objec tion is that private negotiations
involve se riou s valuation problems. The re are two aspect s to this objection.
Fi rst , one might suppose that a neu tral third party is needed to resolve disputes
about the val ue of the debtor firm 's asse ts. The parties ' co nt1i c ting interests
ca n lead them to reach extre mely div erge nt conclu sio ns about the size of the
pool of assets. In general, secured c redi tors ha ve inc entive to make low
valuations of the firm, since equity's share is determined on a perce ntage basis.
Fo r the same reason , the debtor has in centi ve to inflate the value of the firm .
Bu t, except in the event of a cramdown, the co urt in a Chapter II proceeding
does not normally undertake an inde penden t evaluati o n of the debtor's
assets. 49 Judges rare ly resolve disputes over va luati on. If parties can rout inely
reso lve disputes through bargaining in bankruptcy without the help o f an
ou tsid e appraiser, they must be able to resolve these same disputes thro ugh
bargaining outside of bankruptcy as well.
The second aspect is that the ex tremely short time frame in w hi ch
negotiations take place under a suspensio n clause might exacerbate valuati on
problems . Creditors will wish to inquire into the debtor's financial position and
to assess th e veracity of his represe ntati ons . The time pres sure res tricts
creditors' abi lity to do this and obligates th e m to take the deb tor 's
representations almos t entirely at face value. But thi s feature of the suspension
clause sol utio n is not particularly object ionab le. Commentators have noted th at
creditors usu ally consider themselves unable to conduct their own evaluations
of the debtor's net worth in bankruptcy. 50 In the usual case, the debtor
presents a valuation of the firm in the context of a proposed reorganization
plan. Creditors have difficulty objec tin g to the debtor 's va luation, becau se their
access to in formati on about a debtor's financial status is limited . In addition,
disclosure requi reme nts wi ll miti gate the asymmetry of information. Although
some asy mmetries will remain, asymmetries exist in bankruptcy as well. T here
is no reason to suppose th at the parties are worse off unde r a suspe ns ion clause

49. See LoPu cki & Whi tford, supra note 28, at 141 (aurihuting low inc ide nce of contested plan s
fear of overly complex cram-down hearings).
50. !d. at 129-30.
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than they would be in bankruptcy on thi s question. Indeed , th e y might fare
slightly be tte r under the suspension clause solution, since the time and cost
sav in gs help to compensate for any losses due to inaccuracies of valuation.
A fin al possibl e objection to the suspe nsion clause solution warrants
particular atte nti o n. Suppose a workout situation in whic h it seems clear that
th e creditors would fall into roughly five classes if the parties ended up in
Chapter ll litigation, class one ranking the highest. And suppose the re is a
pre ferred creditor w ho is a member of class four, and that she has received
pa y me nt in full. The re maining asset pool is suffici e ntl y large to pay classes
one through three, eve n after the pre ferred c reditor has been paid in full.
Suppose , th e refo re, that creditors from the f1rst three classes are willing to
accept th e workout offer. The remaining members of class four object to the
offer, becau se under it they will receive $.50 on the dollar, whereas otherwise
they rece ive $.75. The members of class five object to th e offer, because under
it they receive nothing and are de prived of their rightful share of the
ba nkruptcy cost sa vings.
Although, strictly speaking, there are no "classes" in a workout situation,
since the eli vision of creditors into classes is proposed in the reorganization
plan, 5 1 the ex ampl e serves to illustrate a potential problem. Becau se the
bargaining takes place " in the shadow" of bankruptcy law, 52 the various
interes ts of the creditors will depend on the priority each can ex pect to have
in bankruptcy. To the extent that an eventual bankruptcy would impose a
hi e rarchy of priorities, parties to a workout agreement have different le vel s of
priority in the workout context and hence sharply diverge nt interests. Creditors
may thus be unable to mobilize effectively against a preferred creditor, because
thi s will o ft e n require unanimity of purpose.
Fo r thi s reason , the parties must append an additional provi sion to the
suspe nsion c lause in the original debt contract: they must condition a workout
offer on unanimous acceptance by creditors. Any creditor who is disadvantaged
by a preferred transfer prior to the declaration of insolvency, but within the
preference period, should have the power to block a workout agreement. The
di sse ntin g creditor(s) could thus effectively strong-arm the preferred creditor
into joining the negotiation s, since if the former were suffi c iently aggrieved,
the threat of bankruptcy would be credible.
T he combined operation of a suspension clause and a unanimous consent
provision would result in an extremely high-pressured negotiation . While the
obstacles to agreement may seem significant under such conditions, in theory
the parti es stand to reap considerable savings of both money and time by
accepting the offer. All have strong incentives to avoid bankruptcy, and they
51. II U.S. C. 11 23 ( 1988); D OU GLAS G . BAI RD, THE ELEMENTS OF B AN KRU PTCY 235 ( 1992).
52. Se e, e.g .. Robert Coo ter et a!., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Smilegic Beha vior, I I J. LEGAL STUD. 225 ( 1982); Robert H. Mnookin & L ew i s Kornhause r, Ba rgainin g
in th e Shado w of th e Law: Th e Case of Divorce , 88 YALE L.J. 950 ( 197 9).
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will the refo re work ha rd to reach agreeme nt. The parti es have reduced
incentives for posturing and game playing in a short time frame, since these
impair the prospects of settlement by ex pendin g valuable tim e and resources.
In additi on, each individual experiences pressure to cooperate, since a
successful workout req uires the consent of all parties. As noted above, th e
advantages of reaching agreement quickly and informally may be high enough
to induce the parti es to overlook the central disadvanta ge of speedy
negotiation s -the inability to conduct an extensive investigation of the debtor' s
assets. They ma y thu s be w illing to ri sk a certain amo unt of inaccuracy 111
valuati on in order to wind up their affa irs as quickly as poss ible. 53

V. UNANIMOUS CONS ENT CLAUSES AND THE HOLDOUT PROB LEM
An indi vidual creditor has incentive to withhold her co nse nt from a
workout offer, since if eno ugh other credito rs accept, the workout wi ll succeed,
and the dissenti ng cred itors will be paid in full. This is known as the "holdout
problern. " 5'1 As Douglas Baird explains , "[e]ven though it is in the rati onal
interest of the group to re negotiate the loan ... , it is in the self- interest of
eac h individual creditor to hold out and hope that others compromise their
claims." 55
Scholars often blame the holdout problem for the low settlement rates in
this area of the law. 56 Whi le the holdout problem is a serious one, it does not
provide an adeq uate explanation for the observed settlement rates. The holdout
problem can on ly impede workouts once the parties are able to negotiate w ith
57
one anothe r. But, as argued abovc, co llec tive action problems render ex post
intercreditor negotiations extremely difficult. The holdout problem, in other
words, can only pro v ide an explanation for the fai lure of workouts that are in
fac t attempted. But as discussed above in the contex t of unc e rtainty, there is
reason to think that most cases of serious corporate finan cial distress pass
di rectly into Chapter 11 , wit hout even attempting a private workout before
resorting to litigation.58 The holdout problem arguab ly provides an
explanation for failed workouts where the parties undertook negotiation s bu t
could not reac h agreeme nt. Nevertheless, the smal l number of attempted
negotiation s supports the contention that the collec ti ve ac ti on problem is
principall y responsible for the low se ttlement rates. Thus , although a solu tion

53. See mpra text accompanying notes 48 -49. In addition, as already noted . the risk of inaccurate
va luation may be no greater in a workout than in bankruptcy.
54. See BA IRD, supra note 50, a t 73; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 2. Mark Roe is responsib le for first
characterizing the problem in these terms. Roe, Sllpra note 6, at 236.
55. BAIRD, supra note 50, at 73.
56. See. e.g., Roe. supra note 6, at 235-37.
57. See supra Part II.
58. See supra text accompanying note 30 and sources cited therein.
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to the hold out problem is called for, it is called for only insofar as the pnor
impediments to negotiati on have been el iminated.
The ho ldout problem di sappears in bankruptcy, becau se it is possible fo r
ac quiesc in g creditors to bind di ss enters 5 ~ It is ge nerally not possible to bind
di sse nters o utside of bankruptcy. 60 If bankruptcy is to be effective ly avo ided,
the suspen sion clause solution must be supple mented with a solutio n to th e
hol dout problem . Seve ral such solu tions h:we been proposed in the literature
to date.
A. Majori ty Rule Clauses
A num ber of scho lars have argued th at th e holdout problem can be solved
by th e inclu sion of a maj o rity rule c lause in th e debt contract. 6 1 Majority rul e
clauses allow a spec ifie d percentage of debt holders to amend the co nd ition s
of th e debt agreements of the other creditors.62 U nder such a regime, a
majority of creditors wh o accept an offer could bind the rem aining creditors
to th e workout share. Majority rule c lauses, however, at least those that impair
the debtholders' ri ght to payment, are barred in the case of public debt by
§ 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (herein after the "TIA") .63
Some scho lars accordingl y call for the repeal of the T IA's prohibiti o n of
majority rule clauses.64 They point o ut th at if two-thirds of the cre ditors are
allowed to cram dow n a plan of reorganization o n di ssenting creditors in
bankruptcy, it is odd to di sallow th e same outs ide bankruptcy. 65 But it is not
difficult to und erstand the rationale for the asymmetry between bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy o n thi s poin t. The situatio ns in which creditors are allowed to
alter the contractual terms of their fellow bondholders over the di ssent of the

59. II U.SC. § 1126 ( 1988) (bi ndi ng disse nting min orit y of class); I I U.S.C. ~ 11 29 ( 1988) (bindin g
dissentin g cl asses) .
60. As Doug las Ba ird writes, "Outside of bankruptc y, the trade cred ito rs ha ve no way to ove rcome
th e holdout problem. Firm may end up in Chapter I I because th e trad e cred itors need a lega l mec hanism
that all ows the majo rity to bind the minority." Bi\I RD, Sl ipra note 50, at 73; see also Kashn er, supra no te
6, at 123.
61. See Robert A. Hau ge n & Lemma W. Senbet, Ba nkrup1n· and Afiency CrJS/s: Th eir Significan ce
10 the Theory of Optimal Capital Stmcture. 23 J. FIN. & QUA~T I TAT I VE ANALYS IS 27, 30 ( 1988); Kas hner,
st1pra not e 6. at 123 -24; Roe, supra note 6, at 249.
62 . Kashner, S11pra note 6, at 124.
63. 53 Stat. 11 73 ( 1939) (cod ified at 15 U.S.C ~ 77ppp(b ) ( 1988)) .
64 . See, e.g .. Roc, supra note 6, at 235 . Sch wartz poin ts ou t, ho weve r, th::tt lifting re striction s against
such clauses may not help, since cred it ors may prefe r not to usc them. He argues that such clauses create
incentives for debtors to make workout offers th at are less favorab le to creditors than the "success ful" offer,
i.e. the offer that retains for debtor on ly enough to give him the return he wou ld get in bankruptcy, plus
the share of the cost sav in gs avo idin g bankruptcy entail s. Sc hwa rtz, supra note 6, at 7; see also infra Part
V( B). He al so points out th at maj ority rul e clauses are no t commonl y used whe re they are not forbidden,
namely in nonpubli c debt iss ues. Sc hwa rt z, supm note 6, at 5.
65. See generally Roe, supra note 6, at 255. Roe exp lain s that thi s asy mm etry was not always presen t.
Prior to 1978, it was the case th at bondholders could onl y be bo un d in bankruptcy aga inst their co nsen t
pursuant to a show ing that junior interes ts we re impaired on ly to the ex tent necessa ry to assu re bondholder
co mpensatio n. !d.
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latter should be carefull y c ircumscribed. If a maj ority of creditors co uld bind
the minority at will, the majority would have every reaso n to offer the minority
bo ndholders nothing on their claims and to split th e rema inin g pool o f as sets
a mo ng me mbe rs of th e maj o rity. 66 Thi s is a dan ger no matte r ho w large a
majority th e clause requires for the offer to suc ceed , s ince the cred itors in the
majority would always prefer to have th e minority 's share to div ide among
themse lves . M oreover, ab se nt restraint s, creditors offe red a return on the ir
cla ims wo uld have every reaso n to rej ec t any offe r tha t fa iled to se ll out the
all owed minority percentage o f creditors, s in ce the co nse nt of th e latter wo uld
no t be required fo r the workout to succeed. Anythin g the min ority received
wo uld be superrluous from th e majority's perspective.
Ad vocates o f majority rul e solutions to the hol do ut proble m may suppose
tha t the m aj o rity could on ly bind th e minority to th e same share that the
majority creditors receive themselves.67 But in light o f the fact that creditors
ca n e xpect to receive differe nt treatme nt in bankruptcy de pending o n their level
of priority, this solution will not work. Th e minority creditors mi g ht e njoy a
higher prio rity than the majority c reditors. Debt con trac ts wo uld ha ve to
spec ify priority levels and to bar the majority from binding disse nters to
workout shares that did no t reflect their bankruptcy priority share. A part from
the o ther complications thi s would add to the negotiation of debt co ntracts, it
wo uld exacerbate valuation problems. For exa mpl e, hi gh prio rity creditors
woul d attemp t to place a low valu ation on th e c laims of lower priority,
minority cred itors . There would be no ne utral judge to oversee th e valuation
effo rts of the parties. Nor could the deb tor be expec ted to offer a dis interested
va luation of the minority's claims, since se nior creditors could collude with th e
debtor to agree on valuation s that wo uld allow them to appropriate a portion
of the minority 's share.
The TIA could be modified to permit good faith maj ority rule
c lauses-majority rule clauses that do not circum ve nt the rights of dissenting
mino rity creditors. The TIA, in other words, co uld co nt ain prov is io ns si mil ar
to sec tions of C hapter 11 that es tablish a baseline for the protection of minority
interes ts: the plan mu st e ither be in th e best in teres ts of th e creditors, 6 ~
meaning that a dissenting class of credito rs mu st rece ive at least as much as
it would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation ,69 or, failin g that , the plan

66. Thi s is prec ise ly what happened under th e old eq uity recei vers hi ps. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd,
228 U.S. 482 ( 19 13) (ho lding that a freezcout of trade cred itors is not pe rmi ss ible). T he drafters o f the 1978
Code adopted w hat is known as the "bes t inte res t of the c red itors'' tes t, II U.S. C. § 11 29(a)(7) ( 1988), a nd
the "fair and eq ui tab le" requirem e nt , II U.S. C.§ 11 29(b) ( 1988) , specifically in order to e li m inate freezing
o ut o f middle-l eve l c reditors.
67 . Alan Schwartz has sugge sted that there is an un sta ted assumpt io n to this effect in the writin g o n
majority rule c lauses. Interview w ith A lan Schwart z. Wi ll iam K. Townse nd Profess o r of Law. Yal e Law
Schoo l, in New Ha ve n, Conn. (Nov. 19, 1992).
68. II U S.C. § 1129(a)(7) ( 1988).
69. !d.
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must be "fair and equitable ," meanin g that it mu st res pec t ab solute priority. 70
But the se standards are admittedly nebulous, since whether a plan is fair and
equitable must be determined in light of the specific s of each case. Judicial
supe rvision is thus needed to determine whether minority inte res ts have been
properly res pected. If left to interpret the import of s imilar phrase s themselves,
creditors would surely attempt to collude with the debtor to push through
abusive offers. To avoid thi s kind of abu se, a majority of creditors should be
allowed to bind a minority only where the inte rests of the dis se nting
bondholders can rece ive some protec tion from an independent third party.
Chapter 11 , how ever, is not the only safeguard again st majority tyranny.
There mu st, at least in theory, be other, less costly ways to prevent creditors
from freezing one another out. If we accept the pre mise of th e creditors'
bargain model that reo rganization is in the interests of the creditors as a group,
a successful workout should not require giving so me creditors the power to
bind di sse nting creditors. Theoretically, there should be a workout offer that
would be in the interest of all to accept. Rather than permit a majority of
c reditors to bind a minority, and then require an expensive judicial proceeding
to e nsure that minority interests are respected, it would make more sense to
retain th e ban on majority rule clauses and to attempt to facilitate private
agreements that all parties would prefer to bankruptcy. It is this last in s ight
that motivates a second proposed solution to the holdout problem.

B. Successful Offer Clauses
In a recent paper, Alan Schwartz offers the following diagno sis of the
holdout proble m .71 There is an offer, Schwartz argues, that all would accept:
an offer that gives each creditor the amount she would receive in bankruptcy,
plus a pro rata share of the cost savings. Call this offer the "successful
offer." 71 In general, as discussed above, 73 equityholders can count on
rec eiving a certain amount of the value of the firm in a reorgani zation. The
succ essful offer thus gives a creditor her appropri ate share of the prebankruptcy value of the firm (i.e. the value of the firm before bankruptcy costs
are take n into account), minus the payment to equity and the workout costs.
The return to a single creditor under the successful offer is presented as
w I = n% (v - s - eS) '
where W; is the workout share of the creditor in question , v the pre-bankruptcy
value of the firm, s the cost of the workout arrangement, es the share allotted

70. ! I U.S.C. § 1129(b)( I) , (2) (19 88) .
7 1. Schwartz, s11pra note 6.
72. !d. at 5.
73. See supra tex t accompanying note 28 and sources cited there in.
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to equity, and n% th e creditor's appropriate share of the asse ts 7 4 Assuming
that the value of the debtor's assets less the workout costs is grea te r than the
value of those assets less th e bankruptcy costs (in other words (v - s) > (v c), where c is the costs of bankruptcy proceedings), the c red itor rece ives more
under the successful offer than she does in bankruptcy (w; > b;, w here b;
represen ts the bankruptcy share) . The creditor thus has no ince nti ve to refuse
th e offer, if she thinks bankruptcy is the only alternative.
Schwartz argues for this reason that " the holdout proble m J oes not arise
75
' naturall y' from the pay off structure." Debtor firms, in e ffect, c hoose to
c reate the holdout problem, by makin g offers which are not th e successful
offer. Instead of success ful o ffers, firms routinely make "greedy
offe rs"-offers that re ta in a larger share for equity than the po rtion it wou ld
receive in bankruptcy. Credit•-rs have incentive to reject greedy offers because
they know there is another offer the firm can make-the s uccess ful
offer- which would be more to their advantage and yet still be worth the
debtor' s while to make. Creditors have strong incentives to rej ect a greedy
offer, then, because they know the debtor has retained more for himself than
is strictly necessary.
Why would a creditor think that bankruptcy is the only alternative to the
successful offer if she does not think this in the case of the greedy offer? One
might suppose that in the face of a successful offer she still has incentive to
hold out, in the hope that others will compromise their claims and she can
reject and be paid in full. The answer follows from the structure of th e
successful offer. An implication of Schwartz's analysis is that the success ful
offer leave s the debtor with no excess funds , and thus with nothing to pay
rejecters . Since the successful offer awards equity the minimum 5%, the debtor
has no excess funds to pay rejecters. The debtor spends everything save 5%.
Greedy offers, by contrast, leave out funds which the debtor can use to pay
rejecters because equity can give up so me value and still be bette r off than it
would be in bankruptcy. 76 Successful offers therefore contain an implicit
unanimity condition, since anything less than unanimous acceptance dooms the
offer to failure.
H av ing analy zed the problem in thi s way, Schwartz presents the following
solution: debt contracts should incorporate a successful offer clause, that is , a
clause requiring the debtor to make the successful offer. Firms wili thus be
unable to make greedy offers, and the offer they make will be accepted.
74. Schwa rtz, supro note 6, at 12. Sc hwartz calculates the appropriate share o n a percentage basis ,
which is accurate in the case in which there is o nl y one class of debt. The percentage repre se nt s the single
creditor' s share of th e class. Thus if a certain creditor holds I 0% of the debt of the class. and there is only
one class, his workout offer will be w; = .10 (v - s- e,).
75. Schwartz, supm note 6, at 5.
76. It would not be worth debtor's while to make an offe r that required it to dip into its own share
to pay disse nters, since debtor would prefer bankruptcy to th at state of affairs. The firm's threat to e nte r
bankruptcy if the succe ss fu l offer is rejected is thus c redibl e .
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The problem with Schwa rtz 's solution, as he himself points out,77 is that
successful offer clauses are unenforceable , since they inv olve a w a iver of the
debtor 's ri ght to us e the legal bankruptcy process . Bankruptcy waivers are
banned. 78 Schwartz therefo re argues that th e ban on bankruptc y waivers
should be lifted. 79 He argues that the ban on wa ive rs se rves no purpose where
the debtor is a corporation, si nce the paternali stic concerns ab out consumer
coercion are inappropri ate in th e corp orate context. Among other thin gs,
individu als have the right to have their de bts discharged in bankruptcy, but
corpo ration s have no such right. 8 Furth erm ore , asy mm etries in the parties'
access to informa tion just ify protecting the individual more than the corporate
debtor.
There are, ho weve r, a number of obj ectio ns to lifting the ban o n waivers.
First, it will be recalled that the solution to the preference problem in the
workout co ntext depends on th e ability of the de btor and/or the remaining
creditors to threate n th e preferred creditor wi th bankruptcy if the latter d oes not
agree to j oin the negoti ation s.81 Under the suspension solution they can do
this , becau se th e parties retain the ri ght to ava il the mselves of the bankruptcy
process after th e s uspension period has ex pired. U nder Schwartz's solution, by
contrast, the parti es have co mmitted themselves to an extra-judicial so lution in
advance. Because they have mutuall y agreed to forego their right to use
Chapter 11 , they lose the threat ad vantage they might ha ve had over preferred
creditors. It is true that prefe rring a creditor would constitute a breach of the
successful offer term in the debt instrument. The credito rs would thus have the
right to sue the debtor collectively for breach of co ntract, and they could
presumabl y sue the preferred creditor for torti o us interfe renc e with contract.
But from a strategic perspective, it may be imposs ible to mobilize a c reditor
suit, since many creditors will be unaffected by the preference and w ould not
care whether their share is paid fro m the preferred creditor 's fund or from the
lower priority creditors' share. The debtor must have leverage over the
preferred creditor for the return of the assets to be ass ured, and th e o nl y
possible source of leverage th e debtor has is his power to enter bankruptcy.
Second, there may be good reasons for retaining the ban on w aivers for
corporate debtors. Large lenders are often mo re powerful and enjoy a superior
bargaining positio n in negoti ation than even ave rage-s ized public .companies.
O ne would expec t to see sys temati c use of bankruptcy waivers, if permitted.
There may be some complex cases, howe ver, where the coordination
advantages of court supervision are indispe nsable. Under Sch wartz's solution,
debtors legitimately in need of Chapter 11 may no t avail themselves of it.

°

77. Sch wartz, supra note 6 , at 59.
78. See United States v. Roya l Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12. 15 (2d C ir. 1983) .
79. Schwanz, .wpra note 6, at 7.
80. /d. at 7-8.
8 1. See supra text accompanying notes 45 -48.

1993]

Financial Distress

2227

Debtors would thus lose a s ignificant body of rights -the bargaining power
conferred b y the ability to e nter Chapter 11 and the ability to use Chapter 11
whe n it is ind ispensab le-and would have gained little for it. Although the ban
on waivers may be unnecessary in the corporate context, a solution to the
holdout problem which relies on this still te ndentious c laim is subject to doubt.
Thi rd , parties might res ist using a c lau se th at contains a waiver of
b~1. nkruptcy. S ince the debtor's only bargaining power comes from his ability
to threaten bankruptcy, waiving the right to fil e in C hapter 11 would impair
the power to force negotiations and inhibit his ability to demand the customary
5% return to equity. Creditors could conceivably ex tort greater returns than the
successful offer provides, a nd the debto r wo uld be unable to object. Of course
debto r could re sist the creditors' demands if he could prove th ey violated the
successful offer clause, but this would in vo lve the debtor in difficult and costly
liti gation on the highly speculati ve qu es tion of what the successful offer clause
reqmres.

C.

Unanimous Consent Clauses

The pure unanimous consent clause discussed in the context of the
preference problem solves the holdout problem without the difficulties the
majority rule and the s ucce ssful offer clauses e ncounter. Unlike th e majority
rule clause, a unanimous consent clause does not run afoul of the Trust
I ndenture Act, because it does not all ow so me creditors to bind others. U nlike
the successful offer clause, it does not entail a waiver of bankruptcy. It is both
legal and it preserves the debtor 's onl y source of bargaining stre ngth. Because
offers that are in the interests of all parties are stable from a bargaining
perspective, a mandatory settlement clause should be unnecessary. The parties
have adequate incentive to settl e once we e liminate the co llective action and
the ho ldout problems.~ 2
A unanimity condition may seem a counterintuitive mean s of facilitating
agreement among large numbers of indi vid uals w ith di ve rge nt inte re sts . People
arc irrational, and one might think that someo ne would always insi st on
holding out, even though it is in eve ryone 's interes t to accept. If this were true,
unanimous consent would redu ce, rather than enhance , the prospects for
agreement. But consider the rea soning of an individual creditor. She would
find nothing to lose by accepting the workout offer. If she accepts the

82. In stead of in co rporating un an imou s consent clauses into the debt contracts. debtors co uld make
their offers conditional on unanimou > co nse nt. Creditors would in effect be presented with a tak e-it-orleave-it offer. But incorporatin g the unanimity requirement into th e debt co ntrac t would be prefe rabl e. since
li rms might be put under pressure by c reditors who wished to attempt to hold out to make the otTer
cond iti oned on the acceptance of less than I00% of the creditors. Such press ure could unravel the workou t,
and. given the time limitati ons under the suspen >ion period so lution , precious tim e would be lost in
reac hing agreemen t.
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agreement and it s ucceeds, she will receive what s he would have rec e ived in
bankruptcy, plus a share of the cost sav ings. If it fails, s he w ill end up in
bankruptcy. If, on the other hand , she rejects, she will e nd up in bankruptcy
anyway. She might consider rejecting in order to induce other creditors to
bribe her to accept. But , like the successful offer, there will be no excess funds
to use to pay di ssente rs. If other creditors give up va lue, they will prefer
bankruptcy, and the workout will fail. Since the creditor knows this, and the
limited time frame creates ince ntives to move immed iate ly to th e cooperative
position, she will accept the offer. The only poss ible reason she might refuse,
then, is if she thought she would receive more in bankruptcy. But by
h ypothes is she will not.
A problem with greedy offers, however, may re m ain. Un der a pure
un an imity condition, what would prevent a debtor from making a greedy offer
to creditors, thereby res urrecting the holdout problem in a different form?
Presumably unde r the time pressure created by the suspension clause, the
debtor has an incentive to make offers likely to succeed. The poss ible range
of ab use is thu s restricted. But some greedy offers will neverthele ss pass. In
general, a greedy offer in which either (1) the debtor's threat to enter
bankruptcy if the offer fails is not credible, or (2) creditors are offered less
than th ey would receive through litigation (factoring in th e costs of delay ) will
fail. The fact that other greedy offers will pass is not objectionable.
First, consider offers in which the debtor is willing to se ttle for less than
he retains for himself under the present workout offer, in other words, in
which there exists a lower offer at which the debtor would still be willing to
forego bankruptcy. In this case, the debtor's threat to enter bankruptcy will not
be credible, and the offer will fail. When thi s happens , the debtor will
presumably make another offer. If the threat to enter bankruptcy upon the
failure of this ne w offer is not credible, the offer will fail again , and the debtor
can make a third offer. The debtor will make offers repeatedly until the parties
settle. The point of agreement will fall within a certain range: a debtor's
workout s hare, ew (return to equity), must be greater than or eq ual to the
debto r' s bankruptcy return, eb, and similarly the creditors' worko ut share, c w
must be greater than or equal to her bankruptcy return, cb. If C represe nts the
bankruptc y cost saving s, then there is some value, x, between 0 and C,
repre senting the s hare of the cost savings that the creditors collectively receive,
where the parties will settle. Thus we can express the debtor's share a s
ew

= eb

+C

-X,

and the creditors' share as
cw = cb + x.
On one end of the spectrum, x = C, where the debtor will receive no m o re
than he would have received in bankruptcy. On the other end, x = 0, meaning
that the parties settle where the debtor receives the full amount of the cost
savmgs.
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If we suppose that mo tiv a tion s are tra nsparent, c reditors can o nly hope to
rece ive th e full cos t sav in gs if the y prefer bankruptcy to any se ttl e me nt w here
c w < cb +C. S imilarly, the de btor can only hope to rece ive the full co st savings
if he prefers ba nkruptc y to any settle me nt where ew < eb + C . R ealisticall y,
credi tors will prefe r a wo rko ut to ba nkruptc y, e ven where cw = cb, since
wo rkouts in vo lve a con side rable tim e sav in gs . The same is probably true of th e
debtor, if not fo r the tim e savings , th e n because of the stigma bankruptcy
liti gation in vo lves . If these fo rces are e ve nl y balanced, the debtor and creditors
w ill split the cos t sav ings. If th ey are not eve nl y balanced , th e n the party w ho
m os t wishes to avo id ba nkruptcy will be forced to give up some po rtion of the
savings to th e other, prov ided his moti vations can be accurately asse ssed.
B ecause credito rs, especially secured c reditors, are eager to av o id th e delay s
ba nkruptc y li tigation in vo lves, one can ex pect co rporate de b to rs to fare
signifi cantl y be tte r in worko uts than they would in bank ruptc y.
If, on th e othe r hand, the partie s can bluff, the n a greedy offe r which di d
not reflect a Nash equilibrium might succeed, becau se the misled party would
not ha ve had a n o pportunity to asse ss th e payoffs co rrectly. We saw thi s in the
context of negotiation s durin g the suspe nsion period: if a debtor can fal se ly
co nvince cred itors of an inte ntion to fil e for ban kruptcy, he may win a
se ttlement he could not win if he we re honest about his inte ntions. But
pres umably no o ne will have bee n made worse off by the worko ut , since an y
one who wo uld ha ve preferred bankruptcy to the workout share can s impl y
refuse to e nter into the se ttlement. It may not, at any rate, be as easy for th e
parties to bluff as one might think. The de btor's motivations are rational and
ari se out of states of affairs that are as obse rvable to creditors as to the debto r.
C reditors ca n make reasonable guesses abo ut wh at a debtor is like ly to rega rd
as advantageous.
Offers under which creditors are offered les s than they would receive in
bankruptc y present an eve n more obvious example of the kind of greedy offe r
th at should fail. It would be impossible for such a n offe r to pass, exce pt in th e
unlikel y event that one party would be willin g to accept less than he r
bankruptcy share in the hope that the time savings would make up for the loss
in value.
VI.

CONC LUSION

To the e xte nt that the bankruptcy literature has taken the collective acti on
problem seri o usly, it presents it as a ju stification for Chapter 11. Schol ars w ho
argue in thi s way, however, fail to notice that the collecti ve ac tion proble m
cannot ju stify the existenc e of Chapter 11 as a wh ole . It provides at bes t a
justification fo r the automatic stay, and it does that only if there is not a more
cost-effective method for preventing a run on the debtor's asse ts. This N o te
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has pre sented one altern ative to Chapter 11 which in all likelihood would
in vo lve considerable cost savings.
On the other hand, th ose who press for private alternatives to Chapter 11
litigatio n tend to minimi ze the importance of the coll ec ti ve actio n problem.
They blame the low settlement rates on the holdout problem instead, and they
con sequently focus their attention on solutions de signed to bring ab out
ag ree me nt at the negotiation stage . Thi s Note has argued, de spite the
importance of e nsuring that the ho ldout proble m doe s not defeat potentially
s uccessful workouts, that th e collecti ve ac tion problem is responsible for the
obse rved se ttl e ment rates. It has argued acco rdin gly that solving the holdout
problem w ill not substantially inc rease settl e me nt rates unl ess ac co mp a ni ed by
a method for facil itating negot iations. It has suggested that the num ber of
private workout agree ments would increase significantly und er a contractual
regi me that suspended creditors' state- la w collect ion rights for a limited pe ri od
o f time, if implemented in conjunction with a unanim ous consent clause.
The efficacy o f the proposed soluti on ma y see m dubiou s in light of the
fact that parti es to de bt contracts do not now, nor have the y ever, included
suspension cl auses in their debt instruments. One might su ppose th at
expe ri e nc ed le nders, fo r example, would have di scovered that suspe ndin g thei r
own and other creditors' state law rights would facilitate negotiations , and
would ha ve attempted it in some form . It is ofte n diffi c ult, however, fo r
individuals to conceive of th e necessi ty of self-limitin g provi sions , solutions
whic h requ ire a willingness to res trict one's own freedom in order to inc rease
one's we lfare. This may be espec ially true in the context of competitive and
somewhat adv ersa rial bu siness negotiations, in which part ies are ex tre mely
wary of weakening their bargaining positions. Su spension clau ses and
unanimity provisio ns may not be used because it is highly counte rintuitive to
restrict one's legal remedies as a method for faci litatin g bargaining . But parties
to debt contracts must attempt to think systemically, and attempt to fashion a
new legal regime based on voluntary, rather than mandatory, rul e-making if
they hope to avoid expens ive and cumbersome ce ntralized proceeding s. The
more parties to financial agreemen ts act as their own po li cy makers, the more
e ffi c ient th ey can make their interact ion s.
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